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Repositories/oxedyne/fe2o3

fe2o3_net/tests/webauthn_challenge.rs

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+r1870400018:72159replica 1870400018created fe2o3_net/tests/webauthn_challenge.rs40 days ago under "fe2o3_net: stateless WebAuthn challenges -- webauthn::challenge, so an unauthenticated flood of ceremony starts holds no server state and cannot evict another browser's challenge (Zoapedia review N5). Challenges::mint(purpose, now) returns 32 random bytes for publicKey.challenge and a base64url cookie carrying the nonce, an expiry TTL_SECS (120 s) ahead and the Purpose (Create or Get) under an HMAC-SHA256 tag keyed per process; check(cookie, client_challenge, purpose, now) verifies the tag, the purpose, the expiry and that the browser's challenge is the cookie's, then records the nonce in a guard::nonce::NonceTracker so a replay inside the window is refused. The used-set is bounded by its window and with_max_used, failing closed when full. A restart voids open challenges. tests/webauthn_challenge.rs: a challenge checks once; expired, wrong-purpose, wrong-challenge, tampered, junk and foreign-key cookies are refused without spending the real one; ten thousand mints hold no state and checks stop at the used-set's bound (Zoapedia F7b)"
+r1870400018:72160replica 1870400018inserted 4.2 KiB40 days ago under "fe2o3_net: stateless WebAuthn challenges -- webauthn::challenge, so an unauthenticated flood of ceremony starts holds no server state and cannot evict another browser's challenge (Zoapedia review N5). Challenges::mint(purpose, now) returns 32 random bytes for publicKey.challenge and a base64url cookie carrying the nonce, an expiry TTL_SECS (120 s) ahead and the Purpose (Create or Get) under an HMAC-SHA256 tag keyed per process; check(cookie, client_challenge, purpose, now) verifies the tag, the purpose, the expiry and that the browser's challenge is the cookie's, then records the nonce in a guard::nonce::NonceTracker so a replay inside the window is refused. The used-set is bounded by its window and with_max_used, failing closed when full. A restart voids open challenges. tests/webauthn_challenge.rs: a challenge checks once; expired, wrong-purpose, wrong-challenge, tampered, junk and foreign-key cookies are refused without spending the real one; ten thousand mints hold no state and checks stop at the used-set's bound (Zoapedia F7b)"