oxedyne/fe2o3/fe2o3_net/src/acme/rfc8555.rs
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| 1 | //! Typed message shapes for RFC 8555 (ACME) JSON bodies. |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! This module owns the Rust-side representation of every ACME request and |
| 4 | //! response body Steel actually sends or receives when driving a certificate |
| 5 | //! through a CA such as Let's Encrypt via `tls-alpn-01`. The goal is narrow |
| 6 | //! but complete: |
| 7 | //! |
| 8 | //! - Response bodies from the CA are parsed into typed structs via the |
| 9 | //! existing `FromDatMap` derive. Field renames cover the camelCase |
| 10 | //! convention used in the wire format (`newNonce`, `termsOfServiceAgreed`, |
| 11 | //! etc.), and `#[optional]` marks every field that may legitimately be |
| 12 | //! missing. **The `token` and `url` fields on `Challenge` are marked |
| 13 | //! `#[optional]` specifically** because live Let's Encrypt staging |
| 14 | //! responses sometimes contain challenge objects that omit them, and |
| 15 | //! without this marking the derive would fail the whole parse with a |
| 16 | //! `missing field 'token'` style error -- the exact regression the |
| 17 | //! vendored `rustls-acme` patch existed to guard against. |
| 18 | //! |
| 19 | //! - Request bodies we send to the CA are built via tiny helper functions |
| 20 | //! that return a `Dat::Map`, so callers get a typed value they can feed |
| 21 | //! straight into [`crate::acme::jose::JwsSigner::sign_flattened`] as the |
| 22 | //! JWS payload (after `.json()` and base64url). |
| 23 | //! |
| 24 | //! Nested compound fields (e.g. the identifier inside an authorisation, or |
| 25 | //! the list of challenges) stay as `Dat` / `Vec<Dat>` rather than recursing |
| 26 | //! through another derive, and the enclosing type exposes a small `typed_*` |
| 27 | //! helper that parses them on demand. This mirrors the pattern used by |
| 28 | //! `fe2o3_steel::srv::cfg::ServerConfig` where `vhosts: Dat` is extracted |
| 29 | //! via a dedicated `get_vhosts()` method. |
| 30 | //! |
| 31 | //! [Written with AI entirely](https://need2know.ai/entirely-ai/code)\ |
| 32 | //! Anthropic Claude |
| 33 | |
| 34 | use crate::acme::jose; |
| 35 | |
| 36 | use oxedyne_fe2o3_core::prelude::*; |
| 37 | use oxedyne_fe2o3_jdat::{ |
| 38 | prelude::*, |
| 39 | string::dec::DecoderConfig, |
| 40 | usr::{ |
| 41 | UsrKind, |
| 42 | UsrKindCode, |
| 43 | UsrKindId, |
| 44 | }, |
| 45 | }; |
| 46 | |
| 47 | use std::collections::BTreeMap; |
| 48 | |
| 49 | use ring::digest::{ |
| 50 | Context, |
| 51 | SHA256, |
| 52 | }; |
| 53 | |
| 54 | |
| 55 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 56 | // │ HELPERS │ |
| 57 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 58 | |
| 59 | fn sha256(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { |
| 60 | let mut ctx = Context::new(&SHA256); |
| 61 | ctx.update(data); |
| 62 | let digest = ctx.finish(); |
| 63 | let mut out = [0u8; 32]; |
| 64 | out.copy_from_slice(digest.as_ref()); |
| 65 | out |
| 66 | } |
| 67 | |
| 68 | |
| 69 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 70 | // │ RESPONSE PARSING │ |
| 71 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 72 | |
| 73 | /// The decoder runs in strict JSON mode, no comments and no trailing commas, so |
| 74 | /// only standards-compliant CA output is accepted. |
| 75 | pub fn parse_json_response<T: FromDatMap>(body: &[u8]) -> Outcome<T> { |
| 76 | let s = match std::str::from_utf8(body) { |
| 77 | Ok(s) => s.to_string(), |
| 78 | Err(e) => return Err(err!(e, |
| 79 | "ACME response body is not valid UTF-8."; |
| 80 | IO, Network, Decode, Invalid, Input)), |
| 81 | }; |
| 82 | let cfg: DecoderConfig< |
| 83 | BTreeMap<UsrKindCode, UsrKind>, |
| 84 | BTreeMap<String, UsrKindId>, |
| 85 | > = DecoderConfig::json(None); |
| 86 | let dat = res!(Dat::decode_string_with_config(s, &cfg)); |
| 87 | match dat { |
| 88 | Dat::Map(m) => T::from_datmap(m), |
| 89 | other => Err(err!( |
| 90 | "Expected a JSON object at the ACME response root, got {:?}.", |
| 91 | other; |
| 92 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch, Input)), |
| 93 | } |
| 94 | } |
| 95 | |
| 96 | |
| 97 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 98 | // │ STATUS ENUMS (RFC 8555 §7.1.6) │ |
| 99 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 100 | // |
| 101 | // The wire structs below keep their `status` as a `String`, because the |
| 102 | // `FromDatMap` derive resolves a field's `Dat` getter from its declared type |
| 103 | // and knows nothing of our enums. Parsing the string into one of these enums |
| 104 | // at the point of use lets every decision the client makes be an exhaustive |
| 105 | // `match` rather than a scatter of `== "valid"` comparisons -- which is how a |
| 106 | // state the client never considered (an authorisation that arrives already |
| 107 | // `valid`) came to be handled by falling through into the wrong branch. |
| 108 | |
| 109 | /// Order lifecycle status, RFC 8555 §7.1.6. |
| 110 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] |
| 111 | pub enum OrderStatus { |
| 112 | Pending, // authorisations are outstanding |
| 113 | Ready, // every authorisation is valid, awaiting a CSR |
| 114 | Processing, // the CSR is accepted and the CA is issuing |
| 115 | Valid, // the certificate has been issued |
| 116 | Invalid, // failed, and cannot be recovered |
| 117 | } |
| 118 | |
| 119 | impl OrderStatus { |
| 120 | |
| 121 | pub fn from_wire(s: &str) -> Outcome<Self> { |
| 122 | match s { |
| 123 | "pending" => Ok(Self::Pending), |
| 124 | "ready" => Ok(Self::Ready), |
| 125 | "processing" => Ok(Self::Processing), |
| 126 | "valid" => Ok(Self::Valid), |
| 127 | "invalid" => Ok(Self::Invalid), |
| 128 | other => Err(err!( |
| 129 | "Unknown ACME order status {:?}; RFC 8555 §7.1.6 defines \ |
| 130 | only pending, ready, processing, valid and invalid.", other; |
| 131 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch)), |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | } |
| 134 | |
| 135 | pub fn as_wire(&self) -> &'static str { |
| 136 | match self { |
| 137 | Self::Pending => "pending", |
| 138 | Self::Ready => "ready", |
| 139 | Self::Processing => "processing", |
| 140 | Self::Valid => "valid", |
| 141 | Self::Invalid => "invalid", |
| 142 | } |
| 143 | } |
| 144 | } |
| 145 | |
| 146 | /// Authorisation status, RFC 8555 §7.1.6. |
| 147 | /// |
| 148 | /// There is no `processing` state: an authorisation goes straight from |
| 149 | /// `pending` to `valid` or `invalid` once its challenge is decided. The CA |
| 150 | /// caches validations -- Let's Encrypt for around 30 days -- so a freshly |
| 151 | /// created order can legitimately carry authorisations that are already |
| 152 | /// `valid`, with nothing left for the client to prove. |
| 153 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] |
| 154 | pub enum AuthorizationStatus { |
| 155 | Pending, // a challenge still has to be satisfied |
| 156 | Valid, // the CA has validated the identifier |
| 157 | Invalid, // a challenge was attempted and failed |
| 158 | Deactivated, // deactivated by the client |
| 159 | Expired, // past its `expires` time |
| 160 | Revoked, // revoked by the CA |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | |
| 163 | impl AuthorizationStatus { |
| 164 | |
| 165 | pub fn from_wire(s: &str) -> Outcome<Self> { |
| 166 | match s { |
| 167 | "pending" => Ok(Self::Pending), |
| 168 | "valid" => Ok(Self::Valid), |
| 169 | "invalid" => Ok(Self::Invalid), |
| 170 | "deactivated" => Ok(Self::Deactivated), |
| 171 | "expired" => Ok(Self::Expired), |
| 172 | "revoked" => Ok(Self::Revoked), |
| 173 | other => Err(err!( |
| 174 | "Unknown ACME authorisation status {:?}; RFC 8555 §7.1.6 \ |
| 175 | defines only pending, valid, invalid, deactivated, expired \ |
| 176 | and revoked.", other; |
| 177 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch)), |
| 178 | } |
| 179 | } |
| 180 | |
| 181 | pub fn as_wire(&self) -> &'static str { |
| 182 | match self { |
| 183 | Self::Pending => "pending", |
| 184 | Self::Valid => "valid", |
| 185 | Self::Invalid => "invalid", |
| 186 | Self::Deactivated => "deactivated", |
| 187 | Self::Expired => "expired", |
| 188 | Self::Revoked => "revoked", |
| 189 | } |
| 190 | } |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | |
| 193 | /// Challenge status, RFC 8555 §7.1.6. |
| 194 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] |
| 195 | pub enum ChallengeStatus { |
| 196 | Pending, // the client has not yet signalled readiness |
| 197 | Processing, // readiness signalled, the CA is validating |
| 198 | Valid, // the CA validated it |
| 199 | Invalid, // the CA could not validate it |
| 200 | } |
| 201 | |
| 202 | impl ChallengeStatus { |
| 203 | |
| 204 | pub fn from_wire(s: &str) -> Outcome<Self> { |
| 205 | match s { |
| 206 | "pending" => Ok(Self::Pending), |
| 207 | "processing" => Ok(Self::Processing), |
| 208 | "valid" => Ok(Self::Valid), |
| 209 | "invalid" => Ok(Self::Invalid), |
| 210 | other => Err(err!( |
| 211 | "Unknown ACME challenge status {:?}; RFC 8555 §7.1.6 defines \ |
| 212 | only pending, processing, valid and invalid.", other; |
| 213 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch)), |
| 214 | } |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | pub fn as_wire(&self) -> &'static str { |
| 218 | match self { |
| 219 | Self::Pending => "pending", |
| 220 | Self::Processing => "processing", |
| 221 | Self::Valid => "valid", |
| 222 | Self::Invalid => "invalid", |
| 223 | } |
| 224 | } |
| 225 | } |
| 226 | |
| 227 | |
| 228 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 229 | // │ DIRECTORY (RFC 8555 §7.1.1) │ |
| 230 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 231 | |
| 232 | /// The ACME directory document a `GET {directory_url}` returns. Every field but |
| 233 | /// `meta` is a fully-qualified URL the client uses as the target of a subsequent |
| 234 | /// request. |
| 235 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, FromDatMap)] |
| 236 | pub struct Directory { |
| 237 | #[rename(name = "newNonce")] |
| 238 | pub new_nonce: String, |
| 239 | #[rename(name = "newAccount")] |
| 240 | pub new_account: String, |
| 241 | #[rename(name = "newOrder")] |
| 242 | pub new_order: String, |
| 243 | #[rename(name = "revokeCert")] |
| 244 | #[optional] |
| 245 | pub revoke_cert: String, |
| 246 | #[rename(name = "keyChange")] |
| 247 | #[optional] |
| 248 | pub key_change: String, |
| 249 | #[optional] |
| 250 | pub meta: Dat, // terms of service URL, external account binding |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | |
| 253 | |
| 254 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 255 | // │ ACCOUNT (RFC 8555 §7.3) │ |
| 256 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 257 | |
| 258 | /// The account object a `POST {new_account}` and every later account management |
| 259 | /// request returns. Only `status` is acted on; the rest is kept for logging. |
| 260 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, FromDatMap)] |
| 261 | pub struct Account { |
| 262 | pub status: String, |
| 263 | #[optional] |
| 264 | pub contact: Vec<Dat>, |
| 265 | #[optional] |
| 266 | pub orders: String, |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | |
| 269 | |
| 270 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 271 | // │ ORDER (RFC 8555 §7.1.3) │ |
| 272 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 273 | |
| 274 | /// Order object returned by `POST {new_order}` and by `POST-as-GET` polls of |
| 275 | /// an order URL while issuance is in flight. |
| 276 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, FromDatMap)] |
| 277 | pub struct Order { |
| 278 | pub status: String, // RFC 8555 §7.1.6, see typed_status |
| 279 | #[optional] |
| 280 | pub expires: String, |
| 281 | #[optional] |
| 282 | pub identifiers: Vec<Dat>, // `{"type":"dns","value":"<name>"}` maps |
| 283 | pub authorizations: Vec<String>, // all to be satisfied before finalising |
| 284 | pub finalize: String, // where the CSR is POSTed |
| 285 | #[optional] |
| 286 | pub certificate: String, // absent until `status` is `valid` |
| 287 | #[optional] |
| 288 | pub error: Dat, // RFC 7807, set when `status` is `invalid` |
| 289 | } |
| 290 | |
| 291 | impl Order { |
| 292 | pub fn typed_status(&self) -> Outcome<OrderStatus> { |
| 293 | OrderStatus::from_wire(&self.status) |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | |
| 296 | pub fn typed_error(&self) -> Outcome<Option<Problem>> { |
| 297 | match &self.error { |
| 298 | Dat::Empty => Ok(None), |
| 299 | Dat::Map(m) => Ok(Some(res!(Problem::from_datmap(m.clone())))), |
| 300 | other => Err(err!( |
| 301 | "Order.error is not a JSON object, got {:?}.", other; |
| 302 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch)), |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | } |
| 305 | } |
| 306 | |
| 307 | |
| 308 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 309 | // │ AUTHORISATION (RFC 8555 §7.1.4) │ |
| 310 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 311 | |
| 312 | /// Authorisation object returned by `POST-as-GET {authz_url}`. |
| 313 | /// |
| 314 | /// Every authorisation carries a list of challenges; ACME §8 specifies that |
| 315 | /// the client must satisfy **one** of them. Steel always uses `tls-alpn-01`. |
| 316 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, FromDatMap)] |
| 317 | pub struct Authorization { |
| 318 | pub status: String, |
| 319 | #[optional] |
| 320 | pub expires: String, |
| 321 | pub identifier: Dat, // `{"type":"dns","value":"<name>"}` |
| 322 | pub challenges: Vec<Dat>, // those the CA is willing to accept |
| 323 | #[optional] |
| 324 | pub wildcard: bool, // set for a wildcard identifier |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | |
| 327 | impl Authorization { |
| 328 | pub fn typed_status(&self) -> Outcome<AuthorizationStatus> { |
| 329 | AuthorizationStatus::from_wire(&self.status) |
| 330 | } |
| 331 | |
| 332 | pub fn typed_challenges(&self) -> Outcome<Vec<Challenge>> { |
| 333 | let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(self.challenges.len()); |
| 334 | for (i, dat) in self.challenges.iter().enumerate() { |
| 335 | match dat { |
| 336 | Dat::Map(m) => out.push(res!(Challenge::from_datmap(m.clone()))), |
| 337 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 338 | "Authorization.challenges[{}] is not a JSON object, got {:?}.", |
| 339 | i, other; |
| 340 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch)), |
| 341 | } |
| 342 | } |
| 343 | Ok(out) |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | |
| 346 | pub fn tls_alpn_01_challenge(&self) -> Outcome<Option<Challenge>> { |
| 347 | for chall in res!(self.typed_challenges()) { |
| 348 | if chall.typ == "tls-alpn-01" { |
| 349 | return Ok(Some(chall)); |
| 350 | } |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | Ok(None) |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | } |
| 355 | |
| 356 | |
| 357 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 358 | // │ CHALLENGE (RFC 8555 §8) │ |
| 359 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 360 | |
| 361 | /// A single challenge on an authorisation. |
| 362 | /// |
| 363 | /// `url` and `token` are `#[optional]` because Let's Encrypt's staging responses |
| 364 | /// sometimes carry challenges with neither, for challenge types this client does |
| 365 | /// not participate in; without the marking the derive fails the whole |
| 366 | /// authorisation parse. `token` is only ever read on a `tls-alpn-01` challenge, |
| 367 | /// so an empty default elsewhere is harmless. This reproduces, in the jdat |
| 368 | /// derive, what the `#[serde(default)]` in the vendored `rustls-acme` patch did. |
| 369 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, FromDatMap)] |
| 370 | pub struct Challenge { |
| 371 | #[rename(name = "type")] |
| 372 | pub typ: String, |
| 373 | pub status: String, |
| 374 | #[optional] |
| 375 | pub url: String, |
| 376 | #[optional] |
| 377 | pub token: String, |
| 378 | #[optional] |
| 379 | pub validated: String, |
| 380 | #[optional] |
| 381 | pub error: Dat, |
| 382 | } |
| 383 | |
| 384 | impl Challenge { |
| 385 | pub fn typed_status(&self) -> Outcome<ChallengeStatus> { |
| 386 | ChallengeStatus::from_wire(&self.status) |
| 387 | } |
| 388 | |
| 389 | /// RFC 8555 §8.1: `token || '.' || base64url(SHA-256(JWK))`. The account JWK |
| 390 | /// thumbprint comes from the caller, normally |
| 391 | /// [`crate::acme::jose::JwsSigner::jwk_thumbprint_sha256`]. |
| 392 | pub fn key_authorization(&self, jwk_thumbprint: &[u8; 32]) -> String { |
| 393 | fmt!("{}.{}", self.token, jose::base64url_encode(jwk_thumbprint)) |
| 394 | } |
| 395 | |
| 396 | /// RFC 8555 §8.4: base64url of the SHA-256 **digest of the key authorisation |
| 397 | /// string**, not of the token and not of the raw thumbprint. The digest is |
| 398 | /// taken over the key authorisation's UTF-8 bytes and the digest -- not the |
| 399 | /// string -- is what gets encoded. Published at `_acme-challenge.<domain>`. |
| 400 | pub fn dns_01_txt_value(&self, jwk_thumbprint: &[u8; 32]) -> String { |
| 401 | let key_auth = self.key_authorization(jwk_thumbprint); |
| 402 | let digest = sha256(key_auth.as_bytes()); |
| 403 | jose::base64url_encode(&digest) |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | |
| 406 | pub fn typed_error(&self) -> Outcome<Option<Problem>> { |
| 407 | match &self.error { |
| 408 | Dat::Empty => Ok(None), |
| 409 | Dat::Map(m) => Ok(Some(res!(Problem::from_datmap(m.clone())))), |
| 410 | other => Err(err!( |
| 411 | "Challenge.error is not a JSON object, got {:?}.", other; |
| 412 | IO, Network, Invalid, Mismatch)), |
| 413 | } |
| 414 | } |
| 415 | } |
| 416 | |
| 417 | |
| 418 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 419 | // │ PROBLEM (RFC 7807, used by RFC 8555 for errors) │ |
| 420 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 421 | |
| 422 | /// A CA-supplied problem document describing why a request failed or why an |
| 423 | /// order or challenge ended up in the `invalid` state. |
| 424 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, FromDatMap)] |
| 425 | pub struct Problem { |
| 426 | #[rename(name = "type")] |
| 427 | #[optional] |
| 428 | pub typ: String, |
| 429 | #[optional] |
| 430 | pub title: String, |
| 431 | #[optional] |
| 432 | pub detail: String, |
| 433 | #[optional] |
| 434 | pub status: u32, |
| 435 | #[optional] |
| 436 | pub subproblems: Vec<Dat>, |
| 437 | } |
| 438 | |
| 439 | |
| 440 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 441 | // │ REQUEST BUILDERS │ |
| 442 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 443 | |
| 444 | /// `contact_mailto` is a bare email address; the `mailto:` prefix is added here. |
| 445 | /// `terms_agreed` must be `true`, which every public CA targeted requires. |
| 446 | pub fn new_account_request( |
| 447 | contact_mailto: &str, |
| 448 | terms_agreed: bool, |
| 449 | ) |
| 450 | -> Dat |
| 451 | { |
| 452 | mapdat!{ |
| 453 | "termsOfServiceAgreed" => terms_agreed, |
| 454 | "contact" => Dat::List(vec![dat!(fmt!("mailto:{}", contact_mailto))]), |
| 455 | } |
| 456 | } |
| 457 | |
| 458 | /// Each entry in `dns_names` becomes an RFC 8555 §7.1.3 identifier of type |
| 459 | /// `"dns"`, and the CA mints one authorisation per distinct identifier. |
| 460 | pub fn new_order_request(dns_names: &[String]) -> Dat { |
| 461 | let identifiers: Vec<Dat> = dns_names |
| 462 | .iter() |
| 463 | .map(|n| mapdat!{ |
| 464 | "type" => "dns", |
| 465 | "value" => n.clone(), |
| 466 | }) |
| 467 | .collect(); |
| 468 | mapdat!{ |
| 469 | "identifiers" => Dat::List(identifiers), |
| 470 | } |
| 471 | } |
| 472 | |
| 473 | /// For `POST {finalize_url}`, once every authorisation is satisfied. |
| 474 | /// `csr_der_b64url` is the CSR's DER, base64url-encoded. |
| 475 | pub fn finalize_request(csr_der_b64url: &str) -> Dat { |
| 476 | mapdat!{ |
| 477 | "csr" => csr_der_b64url.to_string(), |
| 478 | } |
| 479 | } |
| 480 | |
| 481 | |
| 482 | // ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 483 | // │ TESTS │ |
| 484 | // └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 485 | |
| 486 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 487 | mod tests { |
| 488 | use super::*; |
| 489 | |
| 490 | /// Parse a realistic Directory response modelled on Let's Encrypt's |
| 491 | /// current output. |
| 492 | #[test] |
| 493 | fn test_parse_directory() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 494 | let body = br#"{ |
| 495 | "newNonce": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/new-nonce", |
| 496 | "newAccount": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/new-acct", |
| 497 | "newOrder": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/new-order", |
| 498 | "revokeCert": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/revoke-cert", |
| 499 | "keyChange": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/key-change", |
| 500 | "meta": { |
| 501 | "termsOfService": "https://letsencrypt.org/documents/LE-SA-v1.5-February-24-2025.pdf", |
| 502 | "website": "https://letsencrypt.org" |
| 503 | } |
| 504 | }"#; |
| 505 | let dir: Directory = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 506 | if !dir.new_nonce.ends_with("/new-nonce") { |
| 507 | return Err(err!( |
| 508 | "newNonce parsed as {:?}", dir.new_nonce; |
| 509 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | if !dir.new_account.ends_with("/new-acct") { |
| 512 | return Err(err!( |
| 513 | "newAccount parsed as {:?}", dir.new_account; |
| 514 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 515 | } |
| 516 | if !dir.new_order.ends_with("/new-order") { |
| 517 | return Err(err!( |
| 518 | "newOrder parsed as {:?}", dir.new_order; |
| 519 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 520 | } |
| 521 | Ok(()) |
| 522 | } |
| 523 | |
| 524 | /// Parse an Account response and verify the status round-trips. |
| 525 | #[test] |
| 526 | fn test_parse_account() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 527 | let body = br#"{ |
| 528 | "status": "valid", |
| 529 | "contact": ["mailto:hello@example.test"], |
| 530 | "orders": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/1/orders" |
| 531 | }"#; |
| 532 | let account: Account = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 533 | if account.status != "valid" { |
| 534 | return Err(err!( |
| 535 | "account.status parsed as {:?}", account.status; |
| 536 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | if account.contact.len() != 1 { |
| 539 | return Err(err!( |
| 540 | "account.contact has {} entries, expected 1.", account.contact.len(); |
| 541 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 542 | } |
| 543 | Ok(()) |
| 544 | } |
| 545 | |
| 546 | /// Parse an Order in the `pending` state and verify the authorisation |
| 547 | /// URLs survive. |
| 548 | #[test] |
| 549 | fn test_parse_order_pending() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 550 | let body = br#"{ |
| 551 | "status": "pending", |
| 552 | "expires": "2026-05-01T12:00:00Z", |
| 553 | "identifiers": [ |
| 554 | {"type":"dns","value":"example.com"}, |
| 555 | {"type":"dns","value":"www.example.com"} |
| 556 | ], |
| 557 | "authorizations": [ |
| 558 | "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/authz/1", |
| 559 | "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/authz/2" |
| 560 | ], |
| 561 | "finalize": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/finalize/1" |
| 562 | }"#; |
| 563 | let order: Order = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 564 | if order.status != "pending" { |
| 565 | return Err(err!("order.status parsed as {:?}", order.status; |
| 566 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 567 | } |
| 568 | if order.authorizations.len() != 2 { |
| 569 | return Err(err!( |
| 570 | "order.authorizations has {} entries, expected 2.", |
| 571 | order.authorizations.len(); |
| 572 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 573 | } |
| 574 | if !order.finalize.ends_with("/finalize/1") { |
| 575 | return Err(err!("order.finalize parsed as {:?}", order.finalize; |
| 576 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 577 | } |
| 578 | if !order.certificate.is_empty() { |
| 579 | return Err(err!( |
| 580 | "order.certificate should default to empty when absent, got {:?}.", |
| 581 | order.certificate; |
| 582 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 583 | } |
| 584 | Ok(()) |
| 585 | } |
| 586 | |
| 587 | /// Parse an Order in the `valid` state with a certificate URL attached. |
| 588 | #[test] |
| 589 | fn test_parse_order_valid() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 590 | let body = br#"{ |
| 591 | "status": "valid", |
| 592 | "expires": "2026-05-01T12:00:00Z", |
| 593 | "identifiers": [{"type":"dns","value":"example.com"}], |
| 594 | "authorizations": ["https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/authz/1"], |
| 595 | "finalize": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/finalize/1", |
| 596 | "certificate": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/cert/abcdef" |
| 597 | }"#; |
| 598 | let order: Order = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 599 | if order.status != "valid" { |
| 600 | return Err(err!("order.status = {:?}", order.status; Test, Mismatch)); |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | if !order.certificate.ends_with("/cert/abcdef") { |
| 603 | return Err(err!( |
| 604 | "order.certificate = {:?}", order.certificate; |
| 605 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 606 | } |
| 607 | Ok(()) |
| 608 | } |
| 609 | |
| 610 | /// Parse an Authorization response and verify the challenge list comes |
| 611 | /// through intact and `typed_challenges` succeeds. |
| 612 | #[test] |
| 613 | fn test_parse_authorization_happy_path() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 614 | let body = br#"{ |
| 615 | "status": "pending", |
| 616 | "expires": "2026-05-01T12:00:00Z", |
| 617 | "identifier": {"type":"dns","value":"example.com"}, |
| 618 | "challenges": [ |
| 619 | { |
| 620 | "type": "http-01", |
| 621 | "status": "pending", |
| 622 | "url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall/1/a", |
| 623 | "token": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" |
| 624 | }, |
| 625 | { |
| 626 | "type": "dns-01", |
| 627 | "status": "pending", |
| 628 | "url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall/1/b", |
| 629 | "token": "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb" |
| 630 | }, |
| 631 | { |
| 632 | "type": "tls-alpn-01", |
| 633 | "status": "pending", |
| 634 | "url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall/1/c", |
| 635 | "token": "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc" |
| 636 | } |
| 637 | ] |
| 638 | }"#; |
| 639 | let authz: Authorization = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 640 | if authz.status != "pending" { |
| 641 | return Err(err!("authz.status = {:?}", authz.status; Test, Mismatch)); |
| 642 | } |
| 643 | let challenges = res!(authz.typed_challenges()); |
| 644 | if challenges.len() != 3 { |
| 645 | return Err(err!( |
| 646 | "typed_challenges returned {} entries, expected 3.", challenges.len(); |
| 647 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 648 | } |
| 649 | let tls = match res!(authz.tls_alpn_01_challenge()) { |
| 650 | Some(c) => c, |
| 651 | None => return Err(err!( |
| 652 | "tls_alpn_01_challenge returned None."; |
| 653 | Test, Missing)), |
| 654 | }; |
| 655 | if tls.token != "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc" { |
| 656 | return Err(err!( |
| 657 | "tls-alpn-01 token = {:?}", tls.token; |
| 658 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 659 | } |
| 660 | Ok(()) |
| 661 | } |
| 662 | |
| 663 | /// **Regression test for the vendor patch.** Parse an authorisation whose |
| 664 | /// challenges include one that omits both `token` and `url` entirely -- |
| 665 | /// the exact shape that broke upstream `rustls-acme 0.15.1` deserialisation |
| 666 | /// with `missing field 'token'` against a live ACME staging server. |
| 667 | /// With our `#[optional]` markings this must succeed, and the affected |
| 668 | /// challenge must deserialise with empty defaults on both fields while |
| 669 | /// the `tls-alpn-01` entry is still readable. |
| 670 | #[test] |
| 671 | fn test_parse_authorization_with_tokenless_challenge() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 672 | let body = br#"{ |
| 673 | "status": "pending", |
| 674 | "identifier": {"type":"dns","value":"example.com"}, |
| 675 | "challenges": [ |
| 676 | { |
| 677 | "type": "dns-persist-01", |
| 678 | "status": "pending" |
| 679 | }, |
| 680 | { |
| 681 | "type": "tls-alpn-01", |
| 682 | "status": "pending", |
| 683 | "url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall/1/tls", |
| 684 | "token": "reallyatlsalpntoken" |
| 685 | } |
| 686 | ] |
| 687 | }"#; |
| 688 | let authz: Authorization = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 689 | let challenges = res!(authz.typed_challenges()); |
| 690 | if challenges.len() != 2 { |
| 691 | return Err(err!( |
| 692 | "typed_challenges returned {} entries, expected 2.", challenges.len(); |
| 693 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 694 | } |
| 695 | // The tokenless challenge must parse with empty defaults. |
| 696 | let tokenless = &challenges[0]; |
| 697 | if tokenless.typ != "dns-persist-01" { |
| 698 | return Err(err!("tokenless.typ = {:?}", tokenless.typ; Test, Mismatch)); |
| 699 | } |
| 700 | if !tokenless.token.is_empty() { |
| 701 | return Err(err!( |
| 702 | "Tokenless challenge should default to empty token, got {:?}.", |
| 703 | tokenless.token; |
| 704 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 705 | } |
| 706 | if !tokenless.url.is_empty() { |
| 707 | return Err(err!( |
| 708 | "Tokenless challenge should default to empty url, got {:?}.", |
| 709 | tokenless.url; |
| 710 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 711 | } |
| 712 | // The tls-alpn-01 challenge must still be readable. |
| 713 | let tls = match res!(authz.tls_alpn_01_challenge()) { |
| 714 | Some(c) => c, |
| 715 | None => return Err(err!( |
| 716 | "tls_alpn_01_challenge returned None despite a tls-alpn-01 entry."; |
| 717 | Test, Missing)), |
| 718 | }; |
| 719 | if tls.token != "reallyatlsalpntoken" { |
| 720 | return Err(err!( |
| 721 | "tls-alpn-01 token = {:?}", tls.token; |
| 722 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 723 | } |
| 724 | Ok(()) |
| 725 | } |
| 726 | |
| 727 | /// The `new_account_request` helper must emit the exact two-field shape |
| 728 | /// RFC 8555 §7.3 mandates, with the contact entry wrapped in the |
| 729 | /// `mailto:` URI scheme. |
| 730 | #[test] |
| 731 | fn test_new_account_request_shape() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 732 | let req = new_account_request("hello@example.test", true); |
| 733 | match req { |
| 734 | Dat::Map(m) => { |
| 735 | match m.get(&dat!("termsOfServiceAgreed")) { |
| 736 | Some(Dat::Bool(true)) => (), |
| 737 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 738 | "termsOfServiceAgreed = {:?}", other; |
| 739 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 740 | } |
| 741 | match m.get(&dat!("contact")) { |
| 742 | Some(Dat::List(entries)) => { |
| 743 | if entries.len() != 1 { |
| 744 | return Err(err!( |
| 745 | "contact list has {} entries.", entries.len(); |
| 746 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 747 | } |
| 748 | match &entries[0] { |
| 749 | Dat::Str(s) => { |
| 750 | if s != "mailto:hello@example.test" { |
| 751 | return Err(err!( |
| 752 | "contact[0] = {:?}", s; |
| 753 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 754 | } |
| 755 | }, |
| 756 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 757 | "contact[0] = {:?}", other; |
| 758 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 759 | } |
| 760 | }, |
| 761 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 762 | "contact = {:?}", other; |
| 763 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 764 | } |
| 765 | }, |
| 766 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 767 | "new_account_request did not produce a Dat::Map, got {:?}.", |
| 768 | other; |
| 769 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 770 | } |
| 771 | Ok(()) |
| 772 | } |
| 773 | |
| 774 | /// The `new_order_request` helper must wrap each DNS name in a |
| 775 | /// `{"type":"dns","value":...}` identifier map. |
| 776 | #[test] |
| 777 | fn test_new_order_request_shape() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 778 | let req = new_order_request(&[ |
| 779 | "example.com".to_string(), |
| 780 | "www.example.com".to_string(), |
| 781 | ]); |
| 782 | match req { |
| 783 | Dat::Map(m) => match m.get(&dat!("identifiers")) { |
| 784 | Some(Dat::List(list)) => { |
| 785 | if list.len() != 2 { |
| 786 | return Err(err!( |
| 787 | "identifiers list has {} entries.", list.len(); |
| 788 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 789 | } |
| 790 | // Spot-check the second identifier is shaped correctly. |
| 791 | match &list[1] { |
| 792 | Dat::Map(im) => { |
| 793 | match im.get(&dat!("type")) { |
| 794 | Some(Dat::Str(s)) if s == "dns" => (), |
| 795 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 796 | "identifiers[1].type = {:?}", other; |
| 797 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 798 | } |
| 799 | match im.get(&dat!("value")) { |
| 800 | Some(Dat::Str(s)) if s == "www.example.com" => (), |
| 801 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 802 | "identifiers[1].value = {:?}", other; |
| 803 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 804 | } |
| 805 | }, |
| 806 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 807 | "identifiers[1] = {:?}", other; |
| 808 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 809 | } |
| 810 | }, |
| 811 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 812 | "identifiers = {:?}", other; |
| 813 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 814 | }, |
| 815 | other => return Err(err!( |
| 816 | "new_order_request did not produce a Dat::Map, got {:?}.", |
| 817 | other; |
| 818 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 819 | } |
| 820 | Ok(()) |
| 821 | } |
| 822 | |
| 823 | /// Regression test for a jdat encoder boolean bug that broke an ACME |
| 824 | /// new-account POST against a live staging server: `Dat::Bool(true).json()` |
| 825 | /// used to emit the JSON string `"true"` instead of the JSON literal |
| 826 | /// `true`, causing Let's Encrypt to reject the request with |
| 827 | /// `Error unmarshaling JSON`. After fixing |
| 828 | /// `fe2o3_jdat/src/string/enc.rs:633` this test asserts that a |
| 829 | /// realistic ACME payload containing a boolean now serialises |
| 830 | /// through `.json()` → parses as valid JSON → round-trips via |
| 831 | /// `parse_json_response` → yields the correct boolean value. |
| 832 | #[test] |
| 833 | fn test_new_account_request_json_bool_round_trips() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 834 | let req = new_account_request("hello@example.test", true); |
| 835 | let bytes = res!(req.json()).into_bytes(); |
| 836 | let cfg: DecoderConfig< |
| 837 | BTreeMap<UsrKindCode, UsrKind>, |
| 838 | BTreeMap<String, UsrKindId>, |
| 839 | > = DecoderConfig::json(None); |
| 840 | let s = match std::str::from_utf8(&bytes) { |
| 841 | Ok(s) => s.to_string(), |
| 842 | Err(e) => return Err(err!(e, |
| 843 | "new_account_request .json() produced invalid UTF-8."; |
| 844 | Test, Decode)), |
| 845 | }; |
| 846 | let reparsed = res!(Dat::decode_string_with_config(s, &cfg)); |
| 847 | match reparsed { |
| 848 | Dat::Map(m) => match m.get(&dat!("termsOfServiceAgreed")) { |
| 849 | Some(Dat::Bool(true)) => Ok(()), |
| 850 | other => Err(err!( |
| 851 | "termsOfServiceAgreed round-tripped as {:?}; expected \ |
| 852 | Dat::Bool(true). Bool-as-string bug regressed.", other; |
| 853 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 854 | }, |
| 855 | other => Err(err!( |
| 856 | "new_account_request .json() did not parse back as a \ |
| 857 | JSON object, got {:?}.", other; |
| 858 | Test, Mismatch)), |
| 859 | } |
| 860 | } |
| 861 | |
| 862 | // ---- status enums (RFC 8555 §7.1.6) ---------------------------------- |
| 863 | |
| 864 | /// Every status RFC 8555 §7.1.6 defines must round-trip through its enum, |
| 865 | /// and anything else must be refused rather than silently mapped onto a |
| 866 | /// status we do know. |
| 867 | #[test] |
| 868 | fn test_status_enums_round_trip_and_reject_unknown() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 869 | for s in ["pending", "ready", "processing", "valid", "invalid"] { |
| 870 | let st = res!(OrderStatus::from_wire(s)); |
| 871 | if st.as_wire() != s { |
| 872 | return Err(err!( |
| 873 | "OrderStatus {:?} round-tripped as {:?}.", s, st.as_wire(); |
| 874 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 875 | } |
| 876 | } |
| 877 | for s in ["pending", "valid", "invalid", "deactivated", "expired", "revoked"] { |
| 878 | let st = res!(AuthorizationStatus::from_wire(s)); |
| 879 | if st.as_wire() != s { |
| 880 | return Err(err!( |
| 881 | "AuthorizationStatus {:?} round-tripped as {:?}.", |
| 882 | s, st.as_wire(); |
| 883 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 884 | } |
| 885 | } |
| 886 | for s in ["pending", "processing", "valid", "invalid"] { |
| 887 | let st = res!(ChallengeStatus::from_wire(s)); |
| 888 | if st.as_wire() != s { |
| 889 | return Err(err!( |
| 890 | "ChallengeStatus {:?} round-tripped as {:?}.", |
| 891 | s, st.as_wire(); |
| 892 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 893 | } |
| 894 | } |
| 895 | // An authorisation has no `processing` state (§7.1.6), and an order |
| 896 | // has no `expired` one. Accepting them would mean the client silently |
| 897 | // mishandled a status the CA never sends. |
| 898 | if AuthorizationStatus::from_wire("processing").is_ok() { |
| 899 | return Err(err!( |
| 900 | "AuthorizationStatus accepted 'processing', which RFC 8555 \ |
| 901 | §7.1.6 does not define for authorisations."; |
| 902 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 903 | } |
| 904 | if OrderStatus::from_wire("expired").is_ok() { |
| 905 | return Err(err!( |
| 906 | "OrderStatus accepted 'expired', which RFC 8555 §7.1.6 does \ |
| 907 | not define for orders."; |
| 908 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 909 | } |
| 910 | Ok(()) |
| 911 | } |
| 912 | |
| 913 | /// An authorisation the CA has already validated must parse as `Valid`; |
| 914 | /// this is the state a renewal order carries and the one the client used |
| 915 | /// to mishandle. |
| 916 | #[test] |
| 917 | fn test_parse_valid_authorization_from_cached_validation() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 918 | let body = br#"{ |
| 919 | "status": "valid", |
| 920 | "expires": "2026-08-01T12:00:00Z", |
| 921 | "identifier": {"type":"dns","value":"example.com"}, |
| 922 | "challenges": [ |
| 923 | { |
| 924 | "type": "tls-alpn-01", |
| 925 | "status": "valid", |
| 926 | "url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/chall/1/c", |
| 927 | "token": "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc", |
| 928 | "validated": "2026-07-01T12:00:00Z" |
| 929 | } |
| 930 | ] |
| 931 | }"#; |
| 932 | let authz: Authorization = res!(parse_json_response(body)); |
| 933 | if res!(authz.typed_status()) != AuthorizationStatus::Valid { |
| 934 | return Err(err!( |
| 935 | "A cached-validation authorisation parsed as {:?}.", |
| 936 | authz.status; |
| 937 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 938 | } |
| 939 | let chall = match res!(authz.tls_alpn_01_challenge()) { |
| 940 | Some(c) => c, |
| 941 | None => return Err(err!( |
| 942 | "tls_alpn_01_challenge returned None."; Test, Missing)), |
| 943 | }; |
| 944 | if res!(chall.typed_status()) != ChallengeStatus::Valid { |
| 945 | return Err(err!( |
| 946 | "The challenge on a valid authorisation parsed as {:?}.", |
| 947 | chall.status; |
| 948 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 949 | } |
| 950 | Ok(()) |
| 951 | } |
| 952 | |
| 953 | // ---- key authorisation and dns-01, pinned (RFC 8555 §8.1, §8.4) ------ |
| 954 | |
| 955 | /// **External oracle, RFC 8555 §8.1 and §8.4.** Chain the fixed P-256 |
| 956 | /// account key all the way through to the two values a CA actually |
| 957 | /// recomputes: the key authorisation and the dns-01 TXT record. |
| 958 | /// |
| 959 | /// Both expected values were derived outside this crate from the same key, |
| 960 | /// with `openssl` and `python3` (see [`crate::acme::jose::TEST_P256_PKCS8`] |
| 961 | /// for the key and its thumbprint derivation): |
| 962 | /// |
| 963 | /// ```text |
| 964 | /// thumbprint = rIV82OX7WtoQ9t9CvXXciOOey0zuRuaonj8p-bQghoA |
| 965 | /// key_auth = <token> "." <thumbprint> (§8.1) |
| 966 | /// txt = base64url(SHA-256(key_auth)) (§8.4) |
| 967 | /// ``` |
| 968 | /// |
| 969 | /// The §8.4 value is the prehash shape that silently broke the ed25519 |
| 970 | /// DKIM signer: the digest is taken over the key authorisation string and |
| 971 | /// the *digest* is what gets encoded -- not the string, and not the raw |
| 972 | /// thumbprint. |
| 973 | #[test] |
| 974 | fn test_key_authorization_and_dns01_against_external_oracle() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 975 | let signer = res!(jose::JwsSigner::from_pkcs8(&jose::TEST_P256_PKCS8)); |
| 976 | let thumbprint = res!(signer.jwk_thumbprint_sha256()); |
| 977 | |
| 978 | let chall = Challenge { |
| 979 | typ: "dns-01".to_string(), |
| 980 | status: "pending".to_string(), |
| 981 | url: "https://example.test/chall/1".to_string(), |
| 982 | token: "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA".to_string(), |
| 983 | validated: String::new(), |
| 984 | error: Dat::Empty, |
| 985 | }; |
| 986 | |
| 987 | let expected_key_auth = "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA.\ |
| 988 | rIV82OX7WtoQ9t9CvXXciOOey0zuRuaonj8p-bQghoA"; |
| 989 | let key_auth = chall.key_authorization(&thumbprint); |
| 990 | if key_auth != expected_key_auth { |
| 991 | return Err(err!( |
| 992 | "RFC 8555 §8.1 key authorisation was {:?}, externally-derived \ |
| 993 | value is {:?}.", key_auth, expected_key_auth; |
| 994 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 995 | } |
| 996 | |
| 997 | let expected_txt = "XS-wSC2L4p8YkHvL-3QvDUnrIrgSwtrSxnq3xi_9R7U"; |
| 998 | let txt = chall.dns_01_txt_value(&thumbprint); |
| 999 | if txt != expected_txt { |
| 1000 | return Err(err!( |
| 1001 | "RFC 8555 §8.4 dns-01 TXT value was {:?}, externally-derived \ |
| 1002 | value is {:?}.", txt, expected_txt; |
| 1003 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 1004 | } |
| 1005 | Ok(()) |
| 1006 | } |
| 1007 | |
| 1008 | /// `Challenge::key_authorization` must produce `<token>.<b64-thumbprint>` |
| 1009 | /// as specified by RFC 8555 §8.1. |
| 1010 | #[test] |
| 1011 | fn test_challenge_key_authorization() -> Outcome<()> { |
| 1012 | let chall = Challenge { |
| 1013 | typ: "tls-alpn-01".to_string(), |
| 1014 | status: "pending".to_string(), |
| 1015 | url: "https://example.test/chall/1".to_string(), |
| 1016 | token: "TokenVal".to_string(), |
| 1017 | validated: String::new(), |
| 1018 | error: Dat::Empty, |
| 1019 | }; |
| 1020 | // Thumbprint here is arbitrary for the test; what matters is the |
| 1021 | // joining format. |
| 1022 | let thumbprint: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32]; |
| 1023 | let ka = chall.key_authorization(&thumbprint); |
| 1024 | // The all-zero thumbprint encodes to 43 `A` characters unpadded. |
| 1025 | let expected_tail = jose::base64url_encode(&thumbprint); |
| 1026 | let expected = fmt!("TokenVal.{}", expected_tail); |
| 1027 | if ka != expected { |
| 1028 | return Err(err!( |
| 1029 | "key_authorization = {:?}, expected {:?}.", ka, expected; |
| 1030 | Test, Mismatch)); |
| 1031 | } |
| 1032 | Ok(()) |
| 1033 | } |
| 1034 | } |